Summary

South Korea's defense white paper, slated for Feb. 4 release, will no longer use the term "main enemy" to describe North Korea, replacing it with the less hostile "substantial military threat that has posed a direct threat" to South Korea. The change reflects a shift in Seoul's political and security views, but also points to a post-Cold War trend in which the fundamental interests of the two Koreas are moving on a more parallel track.

Analysis

On Feb. 4, the South Korean Ministry of Defense will publish the nation's first defense white paper since 2001. The paper's release has been delayed primarily because of a major debate over the description of North Korea as South Korea's "main enemy." The Defense Ministry has finally decided to abandon the contentious term and replace it with the more awkward descriptor of North Korea as a "substantial military threat that has posed a direct threat" to South Korea.

The change in terminology reflects the changes in South Korea's view of North Korea over the past few years, at least within the ruling Uri Party. But it also points to the shift in inter-Korean relations, where, despite the continued threats and tensions, the fundamental interests underlying each state are growing more intertwined. And unless a new Cold War structure emerges to keep the Koreas separated, Pyongyang and Seoul appear headed toward a more parallel, if still shaky, path regarding their strategic interests.

The Cold War not only created the artificial reality of a divided Korea -- with brother against brother -- but it also provided the fiscal and security networks to keep the Koreas divided. The economic and military support from Russia and China for North Korea and from the United States for South Korea created a framework in which Pyongyang's fundamental interests more closely reflected those of Beijing and Moscow, and Seoul's fundamental interests reflected those of Washington.

The major issue was figuring out which Korea would conquer the other and which Korea would have the dominant political and economic system. Since the end of the Cold War, that question has become somewhat moot. It is clear the Northern system will not, in the end, become the dominant paradigm on the Korean peninsula -- and the leadership in both Koreas recognizes this, even if somewhat begrudgingly in the North. Pyongyang's attempts to set up special economic zones, for example, are signs of the North's shifting views of "self reliance" and a realization that the isolated economic system without a sponsor nation is untenable.

Both Koreas are looking toward the future and see their strength not in trying to conquer each other, but in seeking unification. The North cannot launch an invasion of the South and be successful, as U.S. intervention will ultimately make any such attack a suicide attempt. The South is seeking to avoid the rapid collapse of the North, or any rapid absorption, in order to control the economic and social dislocation such sudden moves would make. In addition, ideology and, more importantly, the personal interests of the elite on both sides of the demilitarized zone, will keep formal reunification from occurring anytime soon -- at least in terms of intentional reunification.

Instead of unification, there is a growing trend of uni-direction, as both Koreas see their fundamental security interests coming much closer to a parallel track. Both Seoul and Pyongyang see the instability brewing inside China as the economic miracle begins reaching the limits of the social and political fabric. Both Koreas see Washington and China potentially on a collision course. And both see Japan as a resurgent regional power, one that might seek to take advantage of China's internal instability. This raises fears of the past, when Korea was in the unenviable position of sitting between two rival Asian powers, serving as either a pawn or a route of invasion.

As the uni-direction of interests continues, an understanding that this phenomenon -- even if on the subconscious level -- is one of the driving forces acting on leaders of both Koreas will offer insights into the choices and constraints of both as they seek to balance domestic and international concerns. Seoul's actions in the six-way talks, for example, are often at odds with those of Washington. Pyongyang's attempts to blackmail Washington into a more peaceful -- or at least non-threatening -- relationship are also a reflection of this growing trend.

Unless there is a re-establishment of a Cold War-type system of competing patronage for the two Koreas, this uni-directional trend will continue. It does not mean unification is at hand, or that tension between the Koreas is over; but as the fundamental interests of both states come closer together, there will be new tensions both with their international partners and within the regimes of the two states as the shift in the decision-making criteria takes place.